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REMEDIES FOR WASTE IN OHIO
The law of waste is concerned with limitations placed by law upon
the use and enjoyment of land. The doctrine operates against the holder
of a limited estate in the land and in favor of the holder of an interest
in remainder or reversion. No act of a tenant will amount to waste unless
it is or may be prejudicial to the reversion or remainder interests. Several
remedies are available to protect these future interests. It is the purpose
of this comment to explore the various remedies and their use in Ohio,
with particular attention to the problem of the applicable statute of
limitations.
LEGAL ACTION FOR FORFEITURE
A tenant for life in real property who commits or suffers
waste thereto shall forfeit that part of the property, to which
such waste is committed or suffered, to the person having the
immediate estate in reversion or remainder . . .I
There has been a statute comparable to this in Ohio since 1887.
There is an identical provision for forfeiture for waste committed by a
tenant in dower which is of even older origin.2 Note that the statute
applies to voluntary ("commits") and permissive ("suffers") waste.
The general rule is that the forfeiture doesn't occur until there has
been a judicial pronouncement to that effect.' However, there may be
some question of its acceptance in Ohio. Under a statute which said that
failure of a life tenant to list or pay the tax on lands shall forfeit the
lands to the person entitled to them in reversion or remainder, the Ohio
Supreme Court, in McMillan v. Robbins,4 held that the life tenant's
estate ended when he failed to pay the taxes. Therefore, the reversioner,
but not the life tenant, was allowed to redeem from the tax sale. The
rule was stated to be that the life estate terminates upon the happening
of the event upon which the forfeiture depends, and the reversioner can
then enter without a forfeiture being declared by a court.3
Although the tax delinquency statute, as now worded, prevents
application of this rule,' it might be supposed that the rule would be
1 OHio REV. CODE §2105.20
2 OHIO REv. CODE §2103.07.
3 Restatement, PROPERTY §152 (1936).
45 Ohio 28 (1831).
5 Estabrook v. Royon, 52 Ohio St. 318, 39 N.E. 808 (1895) restates the rule,
disapproving Johnson v. Pettit, 13 Ohio, Dec. Reprint 394- (1870).
6 The statute now says the life tenant forfeits his estate if he fails to
redeem within one year after the land is sold for delinquent taxes. OHIo REV.
CODE §5719.22. The tax sale system employed in Ohio since 1917, does not pro-
vide for any redemption period after the tax sale. OHIo REv. CODE §5721.15,
5723.03. The sale itself cuts off the interest of both the life tenant and the remaind-
erman. Since the event upon which the forfeiture occurs does not happen until a
year after the land has been sold, the statute is ineffective to declare a forfeiture
in this situation today. Leatherman v. Maytham, 66 Ohio App. 344, 33 N.E. 2d
1022 (1940).
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applied to actions for forfeiture for waste. Since waste is the event upon
which forfeiture depends, the forfeiture presumably would occur at that
time. However, it is very likely that the courts would not hold this way.
The remainderman should, and apparently does, have an election to
sue for forfeiture or damages, or perhaps both. It is reasonable to require
the bringing of an action to manifest that election. Furthermore, if the
tenant automatically loses his interest in the land, the remainderman
could bring an action of ejectment to regain possession. The statute of
limitations on an ejectment action is twenty-one years.7 Yet there is a
specific statute limiting actions for statutory forfeitures to one year.'
Finally, whether waste has been committed is a question of fact, often
a very difficult one. The case of Mitchell v. Long involved a forfeiture
of land by a devisee who failed to offer the will, under which she held,
for probate within three years.' The court said,
Again, it must be observed that it is not a self operating
statute; that is, it does not declare a rule of property, but an
action is necessary to effect the forfeiture it provides for. This
feature is manifest from the fact that it is not delay and lapse
of time alone which start its operation, but a state of facts
additional must be established, which situation can be brought
about only by a proceeding in court.
It is submitted that the same reasoning applies to forfeiture for waste
and that the rule of McMillan v. Robbins is, therefore, inapplicable.
Who can be forced to forfeit? The answer seems to be the person
who is seized of the life estate at the time the waste was suffered or
committed.' ° It is obvious that a life tenant who has conveyed his whole
estate has nothing to forfeit. By the same token, the life tenant's grantee,
who has an estate pur autre 'vte, can be forced to forfeit to the reversioner
or remainderman for waste committed by him because he is seized of
the life estate.
In cases concerning liability for waste, a distinction is sometimes
drawn between legal and conventional life estates. The former are
created by act of law; examples are estates by dower or curtesy, estates
tail after possibility of issue extinct, and jointures. The latter are created
by convention of the parties. At common law it was held that an action
for waste would not lie against the grantee of a conventional estate
for life or years because the grantor might have protected the future
interest by inserting a covenant against waste. The Statute of Glouces-
ter"1 made the action for forfeiture maintainable against the grantee of
7 OsIo RaV. CODE §2305.04.
8 Onro REV. CODE §2305.11. In this connection see Wright v. Conner, 200
Ga. 413, 37 S.E. 2d 353 (1946).
9 9 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 113 at 116 (1909).
10 Howell v. Howell, 122 Ohio St. 543, 172 N.E. 528 (1930).
11 Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 5.
1956]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a conventional estate for life or years.'2 Chancellor Kent said that statute
was imported to this country as part of the common law. 3 Two early
Ohio cases raised the question whether the Statute of Gloucester was
part of Ohio's law, but they did not answer it.' 4 The 1887 statute,
predecessor of OHIO REV. CODE §2105.20, enacted at least part of the
Statute of Gloucester. It made life estates created by convention of the
parties forfeitable for waste. Leasehold interests still are not forfeitable
for waste if there is no provision for it in the lease. This is so even
though it is a ninety-nine year lease renewable forever.' 5 To that extent
at least the Statute of Gloucester was not accepted into Ohio law.
The action for forfeiture is a legal action since the right to bring
it is given by statute.1 6 Therefore, the maxim that equity abhors a for-
feiture should be of little avail in Ohio, although it has been used with
effect where equity courts hear actions for forfeiture for waste.1T It
is to be expected, however, that the plaintiff will be forced to carefully
and completely plead and prove his case.'" The statutes of some states
do not allow forfeiture unless the damage caused to the future interest
by waste is at least as great as the value of the unexpired life estate.' 9
Since that provision does not appear in the Ohio statute, it cannot be
presumed that the legislature intended such a requirement. However,
one limitation is found in the statute. It was also a part of the Statute
of Gloucester. That is that only the place wasted shall be forfeited.
For many years this has been interpreted to mean that if the place wasted
can be conveniently separated from the rest of the land, only it is for-
feited. If it cannot, the whole premises are forfeited.20 This leads to
unusual situations. In a Kentucky case, 2' the appellate court overruled
a demurrer to a petition asking for forfeiture for waste which consisted
of destroying a large part of the fence which surrounded the land. They
admonished the trial court that only the part wasted should be forfeited
12 This is Lord Coke's version of the common law and the effect of the
Statute of Gloucester. 3 THOMAS' COKE 247 (1818). Other commentators are not
fully in accord. See II REEVES' HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59 (1869).
134 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 80 (9th ed. 1858).
14 Stauffer v. Eaton, 13 Ohio 322 at 335 (1844) ; Jenks v. Langdon, 21 Ohio
St. 13 362 at 369 (1871).
i3 Fowler v. The Children's Home, 10 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 557 (1910).
16 Gard v. Beard, 36 Ohio App. 105, 172 N. E. 673 (1929) ; Brown v. Martin,
137 Ga. 338, 73 S. E. 495 (1912). But see Mohler v. Mobler, Ohio L. Abs. 138
(1936).
17 Continental Fuel Co. v. Haden, 182 Ky. 8, 206 S. W. 8 (1918). In Kentucky,
actions based on voluntary waste are legal actions. Only equity relieves against
permissive waste.
18Roby v. Newton, 121 Ga. 679, 49 S. E. 694 (1905); Mitchell vs. Long,
Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 113 (1909).
1 9 Restatement, PROPERTr §199 (1936); See McCartney v. Titsworth, 104
N. Y. Supp. 45 (1907), where that requirement was met.
20 3 THOMAS' COKE 250 (1818) ; 56 AM. JUR., Waste §35.
21 Smith v. Mattingly, 96 Ky. 228, 28 S. W. 503 (1894).
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but made no suggestion as to how this could be workably done. To a
large degree this problem is one for the jury.
The action for forfeiture is available only to the owner of the
"immediate estate in reversion or remainder." 23 An estate tail in ex-
pectancy is not such an estate.24 Nor is a vested remainder subject to
divestment; 25 nor a possibility of reverter; 26 nor a contingent remainder,
according to the dicta of several cases." Obviously a person who has
conveyed his future interest cannot sue for forfeiture for waste com-
mitted before (and a fortiori after) the conveyance because he has no
right to possession. Whether the grantee of the future interest can de-
mand forfeiture for waste committed before he acquired his interest
seems not to have been decided by the Ohio courts.
OHIO REV. CODE §2305.11 says, "An action . . . upon a statute
for a penalty or forfeiture shall be brought within one year after the
cause thereof accrued . . . ." The time of accrual of a cause of action
founded on waste will be considered later.
LEGAL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
... and such tenant will be liable in damages to such person for
the waste committed or suffered thereto. 8
At least three states have held that a reversioner who has sold his
interest can still sue for damages for waste committed before the con-
veyance.29 It is uncertain whether the same result would be reached in
Ohio where the statute is strictly interpreted.3" When there is an inter-
vening estate between the estate of the person who wasted the land
and the reversioner or remainderman, the latter cannot sue for damages
or forfeiture.3 ' Nor is an expectancy a sufficient estate to found an
action for damages based upon waste.32 A contingent remainderman can-
not bring an action for damages because, until the contingency has been
resolved, it cannot be known whether that person is injured by the waste. 33
22 Thus, in Clemence v. Steere, 1 R. 1. 272, 53 Am. Dec. 621 (1850), the
jury was instructed to find whether various parts of the property had been
wasted and, if so, to declare them forfeited.
23 Omo REV. Cone §2105.20.
24 Cook v. Hardin County Bank, 76 Ohio App. 203, 63 N.E. 2d 686 (1945).
2 5 Wright v. Conner, 200 Ga. 413, 37 S. E. 2d 353 (1946).
26 Batten v. Corporation Commission of North Carolina, 199 N. C. 460, 154
S. E. 748 (1930).
2 7 Rogers v. Atlantic G. & P. Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 107 N.W. 661 (1915) ; Wat-
son v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18, 128 S. W. 581 (1910).
28 OHio REv. CODE §2105.20.
29 Dickenson v. Baltimore, 48 Md. 583, 30 Am. Rep. 492 (1878) ; White v.
Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252 (1862); Payne v. Meisser, 176 Wis. 432, 187 N. W. 194
(1922).
30 Hatch v. Hatch, 1 Ohio Dec. 270 (1894).
31 Ibid.
32 Note 24, supra. An expectancy will not even be protected by an injunction
against future waste. Hall v. Rohr, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 690 (1890).
3 3 Latham v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co., 139 N. C. 9, 51 S. E. 790 (1905).
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Relief available to the contingent remainderman in equity will be dis-
cussed later.
The classes of people who may be held liable for damages are at
least as many as those who may be forced to forfeit. There are some
who may be liable for damages although they have nothing to forfeit.
Some old cases held that the owner of a life estate created by law (e. g.,
a tenant in dower) who has conveyed his estate may be sued for damages
for waste committed by his grantee." In Howell v. Howell3" the issue
was whether a conventional life tenant who had sold his interest was
liable for waste committed by his grantee. The court held that he was
not because the deed had not covenanted against waste. This case should
not be taken to stand for the proposition that a conventional life tenant
will only be held accountable for waste if there was a covenant to that
effect in the instrument under which he took. It does stand for the
proposition that there is no relationship between a remainderman and a
conventional life tenant who has sold his estate which will found an
action for waste committed by the tenant's grantee, if there was not a
covenant against waste. 3 6
An action for waste in England under the Statute of Gloucester
involved both forfeiture and treble damages. The Ohio statute seems to
allow both remedies to a single plaintiff, but none of the reported cases
appear to give both forfeiture and damages, although both are often
asked for.3
7
In Ohio the four-year statute of limitations applies to actions for
damages for waste.38
EQUITABLE ACTION FOR INJUNCTION AND ACCOUNTING
The earliest cases of equitable intervention to prevent waste arose in
situations where there was no legal remedy at all, e. g., when complainant
was a contingent remainderman or when there was an intervening estate
between complainant and tenant.39 It was somewhat later that mere
inadequacy of the legal remedy prompted equitable action to enjoin
waste. Common law theories about the uniqueness of land and the right
of the owner in fee to receive the specific thing instead of the money
equivalent made it comparatively easy to show inadequacy of damages at
law. Threatened injury to buildings as well as to the land became
grounds for an injunction.4 In the course of a thorough discussion of
injunctions, one Ohio court has said:
34 Cases cited in 71 A.L.R. 1189 (1931).
35122 Ohio St. 543, 172 N. E. 528 (1930).
36 Donald v. Elliott, 32 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1895). Of course, if the suit is on
the covenant, it is not an action "for waste."
3 7
.Howell vs. Howell, 122 Ohio St. 543, 172 N.E. 528 (1930) ; Kent vs. Bentley,
10 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 132 (1895).
38 OHio REv. CODE §2305.09 (D).
39 Walsh, Equitable Relief Against Waste, 5 ALA. L. J. 253 at 256 (1930).
4 0 1Id. at 258; Fortescue v. Bowler, 55 N. J. Eq. 741, 38 At. 445 (1897);
Poertner v. Russel, 33 Wis. 193 (1973).
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It is difficult to lay down any precise rule as to what mis-
chiefs are deemed irreparable; but the term may be applied, not
only in respect to the nature of the injury itself, as being one,
where the damage cannot be fully compensated; but also to the
position of the parties, where the evil, in contemplation of law,
cannot well be remedied or prevented by any act of the parties
themselves... As instances of the latter, may be stated waste
by a tenant in possession of the lands... In all these cases the
injury might be the subject matter of compensation in damages,
but it is insusceptible of remedy by the mere act of the party
himself, and will be prevented by injunction . . . Every
man in possession of property is presumed to be able to resist
of himself any encroachment upon it. But when he is not
thus in possession, and cannot obtain possession, or otherwise
prevent the act, without himself being a wrongdoer, then
he may be aided by equity. Now, in the case of waste, the
landlord could not enter upon the land, to prevent its commis-
sion, without himself being a trespasser . . . [He] therefore
may have redress by injunction.4 '
There is no indication, aside from occasional dicta,"2 that injunction
against waste is not a valuable remedy in Ohio. As one would expect,
the right of the plaintiff must be clear and the evidence satisfactory."
If plaintiff meets this burden, the injunction will be issued, even against
threatened permissive waste.4 4 As mentioned before, the contingent re-
mainderman has no remedy at law for waste. He can, however, institute
a suit in equity to enjoin waste.45
In cases where the life tenant has already committed or suffered
minor waste (as distinguished from such irreparable waste as cutting trees
or mining), the most desirable remedy may be a mandatory injunction
that he repair the premises. The objection to this is the requirement of
judicial supervision and approval of the repairs. For this reason, the
41 Commercial Bank v. Bowman, 13 Ohio Dec. 125 at 131 (1855).
42 "Common law waste as to life estates has never been recognized in Ohio,
and waste of itself is not a substantive ground for equitable relief as the
remedy at law is adequate." Gard v. Beard, 36 Ohio App. 105, 172 N. E. 673
(1929). This statement was challenged in 4 CLava. B. J. No. 4, p. 11. The author-
ity cited for the proposition by the Court of Appeals was Crockett v. Crockett,
2 Ohio St. 181 (1853). An examination of that case shows the court felt an in-
junction would issue against waste in a proper case.
43 Miller v. Miller, 28 Ohio App. 203, 162 N. E. 459 (1927).
44 Piatt v. Piatt, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 250 (1858). A temporary injunction was
asked for, pending determination of the parties' rights at law.
45 Fisher's Ex'r. v. Haney, 180 Ky. 257, 202 S. W. 495 (1918). It is clear
that this alone does not afford contingent remaindermen adequate protection. Ac-
cordingly, Arkansas has held that equity will allow an accounting for past waste
and impound the money until the contingency has been determined. Watson v.
Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18, 128 S. W,. 581 (1910).
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remedy is refused in England.4 6 However, there is authority for manda-
tory injunctions for waste in this country.4"
When the facts are such that equity will grant an injunction, it
will also allow an accounting for past waste, although this may involve
determination of legal issues and the granting of legal remedies. 48 The
reason given is to avoid circuity of actions and multiplicity of suits. 49 In
Jenks v. Langdon the court does not even question the propriety of this,
but says, "The relief by way of compelling an account for waste already
committed was incidental to such a bill [in Chancery to stay waste],
and always, in a proper case, formed part of the decree."" 0 But if the
court will not grant the injunction, neither will it allow an accounting
if, standing alone, it is merely an action for money damages for which
the law provides an adequate remedy.
5 1
Equity may grant an accounting in some instances without requiring
it to be ancillary to other equitable relief. Generally speaking, those
instances are accounts of fiduciaries, whenever discovery procedures are
required,52 and when the accounts are extremely complicated.53 It has
accordingly been recognized in Indiana that an account for waste may
be had on general equity principles, if it is a proper case, although an
injunction may not be had.54 It would seem that in those situations where
an accounting is allowed in Ohio, an injunction should not be a pre-
requisite to an accounting for waste. Broad language was used in Crockett
v. Crockett: "Certain trees were cut down; the complainants say un-
lawfully. If so, the law furnishes an adequate remedy. There was no
good reason for coming into equity, unless an injunction was necessary. '55
The facts of that case showed no independent grounds for an equitable
accounting. Therefore, it is not strong authority for a denial of the
remedy when such facts do exist.
46 Walsh, supra note 58, at 260.
47Id. at 261; Klie v. Van Broock, 56 N. J. Eq. 18, 37 At]. 469 (1897) ; Union
Trust Co. v. Georke Co., 103 N. J. Eq. 159, 142 At. 560 (1928); Hamburger &
Dreyling v. Settegast, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 446, 131 S. W. 639 (1910) ; Humphreys
v. Humphreys, 15 Pa. Dist. R. 530 (1904).
4816 0. JUR., Equity §100. An extreme case is State of Montana ex rel.
Tillman v. District Court, 101 Mont. 176, 53 P. 2d 107 (1936). Plaintiff tax
collector prayed for an injunction and $1107.69 for taxes. The owner of the land
had torn down all but one small building "of little or no value." The threat to
destroy it gave the equity court jurisdiction and they allowed the accounting.
49 K-W Ignition Co. v. Unit Coil Co., 93 Ohio St. 128 at 141, 112 N.E.
199 (1915) ; Maholm v. Marshall, 29 Ohio St. 611 (1876).
5021 Ohio St. 362 at 368 (1871).
51 Crockett v. Crockett, 2 Ohio St. 181 (1953).
52 OHro REv. CODE §2317.48 allows substantial discovery procedures to parties
at law, but equity may still afford a more adequate remedy. Bonnell v. B. & T.
Metals Co., 52 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 81 N. E. 2d 730 (1948).
53 16 0. JuR., Equity §100. However, the author of 1 0. JUR. 2d., Accounts
and Accounting §48 says an accounting will no longer be allowed in this situation.
5 4 Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225 (1911).
552 Ohio St. 181 at 186 (1853).
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Assuming equity will take cognizance of the case for purposes of
an accounting, what period of limitations governs the action? The rule
can be stated to be that legal actions and those to which law and equity
are concurrently open are governed by the statute of limitations applicable
to legal actions. The actions which are exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the equity court are limited by the equitable statute of limitations
(or, if there is none, by laches) . At most, equity's power to grant an
accounting is only concurrent with that of the law courts.5 That is,
although the equitable remedy is more complete and adequate than the
legal remedy, plaintiff would not be turned away from a court of law.
Therefore, it would seem that the four-year statute of limitations would
be applied by a court of equity to an action for an accounting for past
waste.
TIME OF ACCRUAL OF ACTION
The cause of action accrues at the time the waste is committed or
suffered. Although Reams v. Henney,58 the authoritative case on this
point, was an action for damages for waste, there is no reason to believe
the same rule would not be applied to forfeitures and equitable account-
ings. This rule as applied to permissive waste is different from the rule
of many states. Those states hold that an action based on permissive
waste does not accrue until expiration of the life estate."9 The reason
they give is that until that time it cannot be determined whether the
future interest has been injured by the failure to repair because the life
tenant may still make the repairs.
The holding of Reams v. Henney puts a considerable burden on
the reversioner or remainderman.60 Let us assume he has not been vigi-
lant enough to obtain the preventive remedy of injunction. If the property
has fallen into disrepair, he must sue every four years in order to protect
himself. At least he will not be able to recover for damages which
occurred more than four years prior to the action. It can be seen that
a recreant life tenant could cause the remainderman much expense and
trouble. The multiple damage features of the Statute of Gloucester and
many states (other than Ohio) prompt the tenant to make repairs instead
56 Glass v. Courtright, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 273, 23 Ohio Dec. 253 (1913).
57 1 0. JUR. 2d. A9ccounts and Accounting §44.
5888 Ohio App. 409, 97 N.E. 2d 37 (1950).
0 Re Stout, 151 Or. 411, 50 P. 2d 768 (1935); Fisher's Ex'r. v. Haney, 180
Ky. 257, 202 S. W. 495 (1918) ; Prescott v. Grimes, 143 Ky. 191, 136 S. W. 206
(1911).
00 It should be mentioned that the period of limitations would not begin
to run against contingent remaindermen at the time of the waste. As stated before,
they have no legal remedy because they have no vested interest. Before the statute
begins to run, the claim must have matured so an action can be brought on it.
Taylor v. Thorn, Adm'r., 29 Ohio St. 569 at 574 (1876) ; Hoiles v. Riddle, 74 Ohio
St. 173, 78 N.E. 219 (1906).
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of waiting to be sued. The remainderman in Ohio will be more likely




61 In 40 0. JUR., Waste §16, it is suggested that equity may allow the life
tenant to repair the property and thus allay the forfeiture. The authority therein
cited for this proposition is Johnson v. Pettit, 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 394 (1870).
However, the usefulness of that case is certainly questionable since Estabrook v.
Royon, 52 Ohio St. 323, 39 N. E. 809 (1895). It may be significant that these
two cases arose under the statute allowing forfeiture for tax delinquency and
not under OHIO REV. CoDE §2105.20. There is strong authority that equity will
not stay a statutory forfeiture. 2 POMEROY'S EQUITrY JURISPRUDEN E §458 (5th ed.
1941).
